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I  Preliminaries This Page Intentionally Left Blank1  Introduction and Summary 
Michael R. Darby and James R. Lothian 
Inflation became the dominant economic, social, and political problem of 
the industrialized West during the 1970s. This book is about how the 
inflation came to pass and what can be done about it. To answer these 
questions, we must first discover the nature of  the economic linkages 
which apparently transmitted inflation from country to country like a 
contagious disease.  To  accomplish  this  is  a  very  tall  order, but  the 
interrelated  and mutually supporting empirical studies reported in this 
volume go a long way toward filling it. This brave boast can be substanti- 
ated only by the studies themselves, but first we provide in this chapter an 
overview of  our results and how we obtained them. 
Our major conclusions can be summarized briefly. As to channels of 
transmission, both goods and assets are substitutable internationally but 
neither is perfectly so. The balance of  payments has had no discernible 
effect on the American money supply, and at least partial sterilization has 
been  a  universal  practice  among nonreserve  central  banks  although 
lagged adjustments of  their money supplies to the balance of  payments 
are noted. Currency substitution and the traditional absorption channel 
provide at most weak linkages, and the main transmission occurs via the 
balance-of-payments effects of  goods and assets substitutability.  Our 
empirical results thus  offer support  for the assumptions characterizing the 
portfolio-balance  approach. 
The major cause of  the world inflation of the early 1970s  was an upward 
trend in American monetary growth goals. As illustrated in table 1.1,  the 
American  inflation  rate increased  in  the latter half  of  the 1960s but 
sterilization policies delayed the impact on the nonreserve countries until 
the beginning of  the 1970s.' While the upward trend in American money 
1. The initial resistance to the increased U.S.  inflation may explain the larger increase in 
nonreserve inflation during 1971-75. On a decade-average basis, U.S.  inflation increased by 
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Table 1.1  Average Continuously Compounded Inflation Rates 1956-75 
Adjusted for 
Exchange-Rate Changes’ 
United  Nonreserve  All Eight  Nonreserve  All Eight 
































































1. All inflation rates are computed from the quarter preceding the indicated period to the 
quarter which ends the period (e.g.  average logarithmic change from fourth quarter 1955 to 
fourth quarter 1960). 
2.  The basic price index is the GNP deflator. 
3. The  seven  nonreserve countries are Canada,  France, Germany,  Italy, Japan, the  Nether- 
lands, and the United Kingdom. The deflators used are detailed in table 6.20 below. The 
seven-country price index is geometrically weighted by nominal income weights (see table 
5.7 below). 
4. The eight-country price index is geometrically weighted by nominal income  weights (see 
table 5.7 below). 
5. In these indexes, all nonreserve deflators were divided by the exchange rate (domestic 
currency/U.S. dollar) before the geometrically weighted average was computed. 
growth cannot be definitely attributed to any particular factor, it does not 
appear to be responsive in any significant way to international variables. 
The major increases in oil prices occurring during 197311-741  played a 
supporting role to money growth in explaining the more rapid inflation in 
the second half  of  1971-75,  but coincidental  removal of  general price 
controls in  the United States and  abroad may  have  been  even  more 
important. In the latter half of  the 1970s, domestic inflation was deter- 
mined by the monetary policy of  each central bank and cannot be attri- 
buted directly to the United States except as the foreign central banks 
3.56 percentage points from 1.97% for 1956-65  to 5.53% for 1966-75  while nonreserve 
inflation increased by 3.14  percentage points from 3.60% to 6.74%, respectively. Thus, the 
1971-75 burst of nonreserve inflation may be a partial “catch-up” of the sort emphasized in 
Darby (1979): a lagged initial movement in the growth rate compensated for by subsequent 
overshooting. The last  two columns of  table  1.1 demonstrate that  these patterns  are 
despite-not  due to-changes in exchange rates. 5  Introduction and Summary 
were reluctant to bear the costs of  reducing the previously established 
inflation rate. 
This evidence points to two policy conclusions. One has to do with the 
international monetary system; the other, which partially embraces the 
first, with the control of  inflation. As we see it, a necessary and sufficient 
condition for a country to reduce its trend rate of inflation is a reduction in 
the trend rate of  growth of  its nominal stock of  money. Our evidence 
indicates that the myriad of  other palliatives that have been proposed in 
recent years and continue to be advocated in the popular press as well as 
in scholarly circles are beside the point. 
The problem  with  the Bretton Woods  system  was that over  time 
increases in monetary growth in the United States tended to spill over to 
other countries. Those countries that were more averse to inflation than 
the United States therefore abandoned pegged rates for floating. Those 
that wanted  to inflate  at an even faster pace  did the same. Floating 
exchange rates are thus an integral part of  an anti-inflation program in a 
nonreserve country confronted by  inflationary policies abroad. And in 
our view they are the only viable longer-term alternative in a world in 
which domestic policy goals differ. 
We see  no effective means  for  any  country  to eliminate  inflation 
without the political consensus to enforce a monetary constitution, be it 
de jure or de facto, that limits the ability of  the central bank to print 
money. Our preference is for a fiat monetary standard with fixed money- 
supply growth, but a gold standard would also serve to provide long-run 
(if not short-run) stability. A third monetary constitution open to coun- 
tries other than the United States would be to rigidly fix their exchange 
rates with a country constrained by an effective monetary constitution. 
The strong empirical results summarized at the beginning of  this chap- 
ter could be achieved only because of the creation of  a major new data 
bank providing consistent quarterly series from 1955 through 1976 for the 
United States, the United Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany, Italy, 
Japan, and the Netherlands. James Lothian, who was responsible for its 
creation, describes this data bank in chapter 3. Complete documentation 
and listing are provided in the Data Appendix to this volume. The major 
advantages of  the data bank are longer coverage and somewhat higher 
quality than the International Monetary Fund data which are the best 
alternative. 
Two other chapters complete the preliminary part of this volume. In 
the earlier of  these Anna Schwartz describes the historical evolution 
of-and  revolutions  in-the  international monetary system. Even the 
expert practitioner will benefit from this review, particularly as it reminds 
us of  events which appeared trivial at the time they happened but ulti- 
mately proved to have major consequences. The second remaining chap- 6  Chapter One 
ter of  part I, by  Anthony Cassese and James Lothian, concludes the 
preliminaries by beginning the empirical analysis. 
Cassese and Lothian apply Granger-causality tests to a number of  pairs 
of variables. This provides a direct method for eliminating a number of 
popular hypotheses from consideration and thus serves as a basis for the 
more structural  approaches  which  follow  it. Their tests  of  domestic 
money and prices, for example, effectively  reject the hypothesis that 
prices adjust instantaneously via goods arbitrage and then money sup- 
plies adjust with a lag; in general the timing relation is just the reverse. 
The general lack of  support for prices causing money is also contrary to 
the hypothesis that independent movements in wages or other costs have 
been accommodated by passive central banks. Comparison of  nonreserve 
country prices with either American prices or an index of foreign prices 
provides  little  evidence of  causality running  in  either direction.  The 
strongest  evidence  for  international transmission  occurs  in  the asset 
markets, but even here nonreserve interest rates generally adjust over 
time rather than instantaneously to changes in American interest rates. 
There is  some evidence of  sterilization of  reserve  flows by  offsetting 
changes in domestic credit, but the mostly contemporaneous nature of 
this issue is ill suited to the Granger tests. 
The second part of  the book reports the results of  a major effort to 
build a medium-scale structural model which would permit the data to 
choose  among the  monetary, portfolio-balance,  and  Keynesian  ap- 
proaches.*  Michael Darby and Alan Stockman in chapters 5 and 6 report 
on the specification and estimation of  the Mark I11 International Trans- 
mission Model. In chapter 7, Darby uses a simplified simulation version 
of  this model to draw out its implications for monetary and fiscal policy in 
the United States and the nonreserve countries. He uses the same model 
in chapter 8 to simulate the effect of  the 1973-74  increase in the real price 
of  oil.  Chapter 9 is  an extended digression  on the Lucas-Barro real 
income equation used in the model with mixed success. 
The Mark I11 International Transmission Model is specified and esti- 
mated in two versions, one corresponding to pegged and the other to 
floating exchange rates. There are sixty-seven behavioral equations  in the 
former and seventy-four in the latter, with  a nearly equal number of 
identities  used  to close each model. Each country is  described  by  a 
2.  We use the term “monetary approach” to refer to the class of  models in which goods, 
assets, or both are perfectly substitutable internationally so that the money supply adjusts 
under pegged exchange rates to equal the quantity demanded at the international parity 
values. The Keynesian approach refers to those that assume price and interest-rate linkages 
are negligible and concentrate instead on the absorption channel (increased foreign income 
implying increased domestic exports and vice versa).  In between these extremes lies the 
portfolio-balance approach, which incorporates substantial but not perfect price and in- 
terest-rate linkages so that both foreign and domestic influences simultaneously determine a 
nonreserve country’s money supply, prices, and interest rates. 7  Introduction and Summary 
domestic macroeconomic subsector and an international subsector. The 
domestic sector  uses  a rational-expectations/natural-rate  approach to 
determine real income,  the price level, and interest rates given exogenous 
real government spending and endogenous nominal money and exports. 
Nominal  money  is  determined within  the subsector by  central  bank 
reaction functions which are responsive to inflation, unemployment or 
transitory income, unexpected government spending, and (for the non- 
reserve countries  only) the scaled balance of payments. The  international 
subsector determines exports, imports, import prices, capital flows, the 
balance of  payments, and (for the nonreserve countries in the floating 
version) the exchange rate. The model is specified so that goods or capital 
flows may overwhelm any attempt at independent nonreserve monetary 
policy, but whether this is so depends on the estimated values of various 
parameters. Other potential international linkages include a currency 
substitution  channel in the money-demand  functions, the traditional 
Keynesian absorption channel, and direct effects of  the real price of  oil. 
The estimation  of  the Mark I11  International Transmission  Model 
yielded some surprising results which can be summarized by the state- 
ment that linkages among countries joined  by pegged exchange rates 
appear to be much looser or more elusive than has been assumed in many 
previous studies. In  particular, substantial or  complete sterilization of the 
contemporaneous balance of payments appears to  be a universal practice 
among central banks so that domestic credit is properly treated as an 
endogenous variable. Sterilization policies increase these central banks’ 
control of  their domestic money supplies, which is made possible by the 
relatively weak substitutability of goods and assets as estimated in the 
trade and capital flows equations, respectively.  Currency substitution 
does not appear to provide much of  a link either: Foreign interest rates 
are statistically  significant  only  in  the  British  and Japanese money- 
demand functions, and the coefficients are very small in absolute magni- 
tude. 
The slow and weak international transmission estimated in the Mark 
I11 Model was explored further in a series of  simulation experiments 
reported in chapter 7. First, a simplified simulation version, the Mark IV 
International Simulation Model, was created by dropping insignificant 
variables and combining terms where a priori hypotheses on equality of 
coefficients were not rejected by the data. The pegged version of the 
Mark IV Model is dynamically stable and appears to track the actual 
values of  the variables well throughout the eight-year feasible simulation 
period. Unfortunately dynamic instabilities  become  important in  the 
floating version  after only seven quarters; this apparently reflects  the 
impossibility of adequately eliminating simultaneous equation bias with 
the short sample available for some of  the floating equations. 
Two types of  simulation experiments were designed to illustrate the 8  Chapter One 
model’s implications for monetary and fiscal policy. Care was taken that 
the experiments were consistent with the actual evolution of  nominal 
money and real government spending in the sample period: The money 
experiments  involved a one-quarter increase in the disturbance of  a given 
country’s money-supply reaction function, and the government spending 
experiments considered a one-quarter increase in unexpected real gov- 
ernment spending. The less reliable data for France, Italy, and Japan 
yielded mutually inconsistent results here as in a number of  other inst- 
ances reported in this volume. Accordingly, the discussion centers on the 
other five countries. 
Under pegged exchange rates, only the German simulations indicated 
an immediate  if partial movement in the money supply in response to the 
American money-supply  shock.  The Netherlands money  supply  also 
adjusted but with a lag, while the British and Canadian money supplies 
seemed unaffected by American monetary policy. These results reflect 
the weakness of  both the estimated international linkages among coun- 
tries  and the liquidity  effect  on domestic interest  rates.  British  and 
German money-supply shock experiments both indicated considerable 
control of their respective domestic money supplies at least for the first 
several years. 
The instability of the floating version model precluded much substan- 
tive discussion, but the American money shock experiment was reported 
to  illustrate a possibly perverse effect of  the estimated J curves in import 
demand equations. Because short-run price elasticity of import demand 
is much smaller than in the long run, the immediate effect of  a deprecia- 
tion is to increase the value of imports and so worsen the balance of trade. 
In  the simulations  reported, this  J-curve  phenomenon in  a  general 
equilibrium setting implied that some other currencies initially depreci- 
ated in  response  to an unexpected  increase in  the American  money 
The experiments involving shocks to government spending indicated 
the largest temporary effects for the American  case where the shock 
implied a permanent increase in the level of real government spending 
and  an induced  increase  in  the money  supply. The total  multiplier 
amounted to about 1.5 in the quarter of  maximum impact. In the British 
case, government  spending was permanently increased by only about half 
of  the initial shock and even using this small base the peak multiplier is 
only about 0.75 because of  perverse effects of  induced  money-supply 
changes. No significant effects were estimated in the German case. Only 
the American fiscal shock had significant international repercussions, and 
those seemed to be due  as  much to the increased American money supply 
as to the induced increases in foreign exports. 
In chapter 8 Darby attempts to assess the role of oil price increases in 
the 1970s world inflation. A formal analysis focuses on the two channels 
supply. 9  Introduction and Summary 
by which an effect on the price level might occur: induced decreases in the 
real quantity of  money demanded and induced increases in the nominal 
quantity  of  money supplied. The major result  is that the theoretical, 
estimated, and  simulated  results  are not  at all  robust  to changes in 
specification: The effect on the price levelcould be as little as 0 or as much 
as  5%;  in terms of inflationary trends over say four years, this implies only 
a range of 0 to 1%%  effect on the average inflation rate. Reference to 
table 1.1 will illustrate the sense in which this range implies that the oil 
price shock played at most a supporting role in explaining the 1971-75 
increase in the world inflation rate. 
The main reason for the ambiguity in  the estimated and simulated 
price-level effect of  the oil price shock is  the coincidental removal of 
general price controls in a number of countries. On the whole, those 
countries which removed price controls during 1973-74  are also those for 
which we obtain a significant decrease in real income (and so real money 
demand) as a result of  the 1973-74  oil price increase. Only future re- 
search can unravel whether these estimated oil price effects are real or a 
statistical illusion due to overstatement of  measured  real income and 
understatement of  the increased price level due to price controls.3 
A disturbing feature of  the Mark I11 Model was the relatively poor 
explanatory power of the real-income equation for nonreserve countries. 
This equation explains the growth rate of real income by lagged logarith- 
mic transitory income and current and lagged values of the shocks (in- 
novations) in nominal money, real government spending, and real ex- 
ports. It is thus an extended version of  Barro’s approach to solving a 
standard aggregate demand curve in conjunction with the Lucas aggre- 
gate supply function. Experiments reported in this chapter show that 
distributed lags on the actual rather than unexpected value of the aggre- 
gate demand variables do no better for the nonreserve countries and 
worse for the United States.  While the relatively poor nonreserve country 
results may be due to greater measurement problems, these results do 
suggest  a  cautious  approach toward  application  of  the Barro-Lucas 
equation. 
The third part of this volume continues examination of the degree to 
which national economies are linked in statistical environments other 
than the Mark I11  and IV Models. The authors of  these four chapters 
either apply a relatively model-free approach or else use smaller-scale 
models so that the results are more simply interpreted. Darby and Laskar 
in chapters 10 and 11, respectively, both test for the exercise of monetary 
control by nonreserve central banks under pegged exchange rates. They 
3.  As price controls are removed and hidden price increases measured, removal of 
understatement in the deflators would cause a decrease in reported real output and an 
increase in the reported price level. 10  Chapter One 
show that previous tests were biased by failure to control for sterilization 
and that monetary control was in fact exercised by these central banks. 
The implied ability of sterilized intervention to affect floating exchange 
rates is developed by Dan Lee in a dynamic portfolio-balance model. In 
chapter 13, Michael Melvin provides further empirical evidence for the 
portfolio-balance approach by introducing exchange-rate risk covariance 
measures implied by the international-asset-pricing model. 
In chapter 10, Darby develops a convenient expositional model which 
includes as special cases variants of the monetary approach both with and 
without sterilization. This framework makes domestic credit, which is 
endogenous with sterilization, a superfluous concept. The analysis illus- 
trates two points: (1) Factors (other than the current balance of  pay- 
ments) appearing in the nominal-money reaction function will be un- 
correlated with actual growth in nominal money if  either variant of  the 
monetary approach holds.  (2) Expectational  instability  may  imply  a 
limited feasible range within which monetary control can be exercised. 
The first of  these two conclusions underlies Darby’s empirical test of 
the null hypothesis that the nonreserve countries did not exercise control 
over their domestic money supplies. This hypothesis could be rejected at 
the 5% level or better for six of  the seven countries, the exception being 
the Netherlands. 
Laskar specifies a set of small-scale models to test whether offsetting 
capital  flows defeat attempts by  partially  sterilizing central  banks to 
exercise monetary control. The “offset coefficient” is significantly less 
than the no-control value for six countries at the 5% level and for Canada 
at the 10% level. Laskar goes further to measure the fraction of a shift in 
the money-supply reaction  function which will actually be reflected in 
money growth when account is taken of  the extent (always significant) to 
which the central bank sterilizes the induced capital flows. He finds that 
this fraction  is  always significantly greater than 0 and  in  no case sig- 
nificantly less than 1. 
Because of dynamic instabilities, the floating version of the Mark IV 
International Simulation Model is relatively uninformative on the effects 
of  nonreserve monetary and exchange policy. Dan Lee provides a theo- 
retical  analysis  of  the  effects  of  foreign  exchange and open market 
operations consistent with imperfect substitutability of assets and strong 
expectational effects on interest rates. He reconciles long-run neutrality 
with differential short-run effects on exchange rates and interest rates of 
the two means of creating money. Of particular interest is his analysis of 
the lack of  overshooting in the exchange rate if rational inflation expecta- 
tions cause the nominal interest rate to rise during the adjustment to an 
unexpected increase in  the money supply. 
Michael Melvin demonstrates that it is feasible to specify proxies for 11  Introduction and Summary 
exchange-rate risk which are consistent with standard finance theory and 
also contribute significantly to the explanatory power of net-capital-flow 
equations in the partial adjustment formulation. His attempts to replace 
the capital-flows equations in the Mark I11 Model with his own formula- 
tion proved unsuccessful, however, as a consequence of the absence of a 
satisfactory  correlation between the risk variables and the instrument 
variables. When Melvin uses an alternative data set covering 1973-78, 
the empirical  dominance  of  his  formulation  improves over  standard 
formulations. His results thus provide single-equation estimation results 
supportive of  the empirical value of the portfolio approach. 
Part IV addresses the question of what were the causes of  the inflation 
of the late 1960s and the 1970s in the United States and our other seven 
industrialized countries. In chapter 14, Gandolfi and Lothian use a re- 
duced-form price equation derived along the lines of  Barro (1978) to 
assess  the relative  roles  of  domestic money,  international  price  and 
monetary developments, and oil price changes. Next Darby shows that 
purchasing-power parity can be a useful paradigm for understanding the 
harmonization of  inflationary trends even though the predictability of  the 
purchasing-power ratio deteriorates over time. The same analysis ex- 
plains why monetary growth variations may explain nearly all variations 
in trend inflation rates despite random permanent shifts in the money- 
demand function such as reported by Gandolfi and Lothian. In chapter 
16, Darby confirms their findings that American money-supply growth 
has evolved independently of foreign influences and goes further to show 
that variations in American money growth explain practically all varia- 
tions in American inflation trends. Thus an exogenous rise in American 
inflationary trends operating  primarily via monetary channels to maintain 
purchasing-power-parity  growth  trends is  found  to be  the dominant 
source of the inflation which infected the industrialized West in the early 
1970s. 
Specifically,  in  chapter 14 Gandolfi and Lothian  combine a  Lucas 
aggregate supply function and a conventional money-demand function to 
obtain a reduced-form  price equation in  nominal  money, permanent 
income, the long-term interest  rate, and a distributed lag on money- 
supply shocks.  International factors enter these basic  equations only 
indirectly through expected money supply as lagged scaled balances of 
payments or American money growth are found significant as predictors 
of  current money growth. The authors tried  adding foreign variables 
which might shift the aggregate supply function directly into their basic 
price equations: the real price of  oil, a world commodity price index, the 
American price deflator, and a rest-of-world price index. These variables 
were generally insignificant although the oil price was significant in nearly 
all of the cases examined. The estimated fraction of  total inflation attrib- 12  Chapter One 
utable to oil price increases had a median value of  only 15%  for 1973-74, 
or 9% over the longer period of  1973-76.4 In summary Gandolfi and 
Lothian’s results indicate that domestic monetary developments rather 
than foreign price movements were the dominant  proximate determinant 
of price behavior with at most a supporting role for the oil price increase 
even during 1973-74. 
In  chapter  15, Darby  focuses  on  the  statistical  paradox that  the 
variance of average growth rate of the purchasing-power ratio goes to 0 as 
the prediction interval increases while the variance of  the level of  the 
same ratio goes to infinity. He uses data from  1971 through  1978 to 
illustrate that substantial variations in the level of the purchasing-power 
ratio may occur even though the (exchange-rate converted) reserve coun- 
try inflation rate adequately explains the domestic inflation rates in the 
nonreserve countries. The point is to illustrate the dominance of system- 
atic factors in  trend  inflation  despite the presence of  significant  ran- 
dom-walk elements moving other price  levels relative  to that of  the 
United States. 
Darby elaborates this theme further in chapter 16. First, he shows that 
world  inflation trends are determined exogenously under pegged  ex- 
change rates within  the reserve-currency country if  both its nominal 
money-supply growth and its real money-demand growth are unrespon- 
sive to foreign influences. The American money-supply reaction function 
is explored at length in search of a response to either gold flows or the 
balance of  payments on a official reserves settlement basis. Since only 
insignificant  and generally perverse effects of  these variables are esti- 
mated, the conclusion is that American nominal money growth is indeed 
exogenous with respect to foreign influences. Finally, Darby turns to the 
question  of  whether or not  the foreign influences on  American  real 
money  demand detected with  quarterly  data have any  significant  in- 
fluence on its trend growth rate. While a substantial fraction (40 to 20%) 
of the variance of inflation cannot be explained by nominal money growth 
using quarterly, annual, or biennial observations, this fraction drops to 
only 3%  for quadrennial observations. Thus factors-domestic  or for- 
eign-other than nominal money growth variations play no appreciable 
role in explaining variations in either the growth rate of the real quantity 
of  money demanded or the American inflation rate. 
We conclude that American inflation caused by  the Federal Reserve 
System was an exogenous source of world inflationary trends. Because of 
the unwillingness of their central banks to appreciate or float their curren- 
cies until in extremis, the nonreserve countries too caught the American 
disease. The lag of  the nonreserve countries behind the American lead 
noted previously in table 1.1  reflects the operation of a slower specie-flow 
4. These numbers are for the estimates made with a second-order autoregressive correc- 
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mechanism rather than the smooth contemporaneous  adjustment  posited 
by the monetary approach. This mechanism may have accentuated the 
variability of the nonreserve inflation rates during the catch-up period of 
the early 1970s as increasing balance-of-payments  surpluses finally in- 
duced very rapid money-supply growth. 
We opened this chapter with a summary of the conclusions that we 
have drawn from the research reported both in thisvolume and by others. 
Those conclusions and the reasons for them are presented in detail in the 
final chapter. If the research reported here has gone a long way toward 
answering basic questions about linkages among countries and the causes 
and cures of the recent inflation, it is only because there was so much to 
do. More remains to be done, and we close by  outlining a program of 
promising areas for future research. 
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